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Since at least the time of Descartes, one of the most impor­tant issues facing Western philosophers has been the relationship between the internal world of individual human consciousness and the external world of physical 
objects. Some thinkers, most notably Berkeley and Hegel, sought 
to resolve the issue by altogether denying the existence of an 
objective world beyond sense perception. Others, such as W. V. 
Quine, have gone to the opposite extreme by denying the exis­
tence of consciousness, mental substances, or anything else 
which could be said to exist apart from the physical world,l All of 
these views share in common the idea that some kind of polarity 
allegedly exists between the external and the internal, such that 
one is inexorably occasioned by, or derived from, the other, 
I have argued elsewhere that an examination of the ax­
ioms of formal logic, rather than of the nature or structul'e of 
consciousness, may provide a clue as to the ontological status of 
physical objects.2 In what follows, I hope to draw upon and 
improve this idea in an effort to provide a deductive proof for the 
existence of physical objects apart from cognition, In so doing, 
my chief goal is to establish a prima facie distinction between the 
existence of physical objects and the cognitive realization of those 
objects as such. I shall not attempt to deal with broader issues 
pertaining to the ontological status of consciousness, cOgnition, 
and the like. 
I. Strong Idealism Defined 
Unlike their ancient and medieval forbearers, the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment were especially fascinated by the vagaries of 
sense perception. By shifting the focus of philosophy from reason 
to perceived experience, Locke, Berkeley, Hurne, and their ilk 
radically challenged the longstanding Aristotelian correspon­
dence theory of knowledge and its accompanying metaphysical 
doctrines. More importantly, they called into question the very 
intelligibility of a "real world" which can be said to exist inde­
pendently of knowing, experiencing subjects. In an orderly, 
piecemeal succession, the empiricists divested epistemology of 
its old tokens, starting with Locke's doubting of substantial 
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qualities and ending with Bume's rejection of substance and 
mind. 
Although Burne is not an idealist in the strict sense, he 
nonetheless provides a very good example of the kind of thinking 
1 wish to criticize in this paper. Bume begins his Treatise of 
Human Nature with a detailed consideration of the origin of ideas. 
All perceptions, he says, can be divided into ideas and impres­
sions. The latter are those perceptions which /Ienter with most 
force and violence/' including physical sensations, desires, emo­
tions, etc. (1:1:1). The former, in contrast, are "faint images" of 
impressions which emerge in the course of thinking and dis­
course. According to Bume, all thoughts and ideas ultimately 
come from impressions. We could not have ideas for things for 
which we have no impressions whatsoever (1:1:1). 
All ideas of the mind seem to be interconnected by some 
universal set of principles (1:1:4). The first of these, which Bume 
terms resemblance, refers to the way in which particular ideas or 
impressions are said to be similar to other ideas or impressions. 
The second, contiguihj, refers to the way in which particular ideas 
or impressions are ordered in time and space. The third, cause and 
effect, refers to the way in which certain ideas 01' impressions 
cause or bring about other ideas or impressions. The first two 
principles pertain to relations belween ideas and can be divided 
into qualities such as identity, quality, etc. (1:1:5). Cause and 
effect, in contrast pertains to all contingent matters of fact about 
the world (1:3:2). 
Cause and effect, again, refers to relationships in which 
particular ideas or impressions seem to cause or occasion other 
ideas or impressions. Hume argues that empirical observation, 
rather than a priori reasoning, leads us to posit cause and effect: 
"Though the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects canies 
its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers, it must 
never lose sight of them entirely, nor reason merely upon its own 
ideas..." (1:3:4). The observation of causal relationships between 
impressions forms the basis of human experience as well as all 
reasoning about matters of fact (1:3:4-5). 
Given that resemblance, contiguity, and causation are the 
only ties that unite our ideas together in consciousness, how are 
we to discern between true beliefs about matters of fact and 
fictitious beliefs? In the first place, Burne says, a belief is not the 
same thing as a simple idea. Rather, belief is IIa particular manner 
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of forming an idea" which convinces the mind of some thing's 
existence (1:3:7). The idea, moreover, is always formed according 
to relational and/or causal relationships between present impres­
sions or impressions given to us in the past (1:3:8). To put it 
another \\'ay, the mind forms beliefs according to the resem­
blance, contiguity, or causal connections which subsist among 
particular impressions and ideas. In cases of demonstration, truth 
is established precisely because falsity is unintelligible. But in 
cases of matters of fact, true belief is established to the extent that 
such a belief corresponds to present impressions, impressions 
given in the past, or an agglomeration of both. Thus for Hume, all 
human knowledge reduces to ideas; we can have no knowledge 
of substance. 
This account of knowledge differs from that of Locke and 
Berkeley in a number of important ways, a few of which are 
certainly worth noting. For Locke, the mind can only form simple 
ideas from the primary substantial qualities of objects of experi­
ence, e.g., extension, numbers, the power to produce secondary 
qualities in minds, etc. (II:2). Locke takes for granted that minds 
exist and that these minds form ideas from the primary qualities 
of objects of experience. It follows, then, that we can know 
something of the substance - that is, the world outside our minds 
- but only through its power to produce ideas within us. For 
Berkeley, in contrast, we cannot even know the primary qualities 
of substances (1:9-10). All we know are the ideas given to the 
mind. It is impossible to know whether these ideas correspond to 
some substance separate from our own minds. Hume goes one 
step further then both Locke and Berkeley by suggesting that all 
knowledge reduces to ideas formed from impressions. We cannot 
even assume a "mind" to which ideas are given, for the idea of 
mind is not formed from present or past impressions. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the afore­
mentioned notion that all knowledge of existing things reduces 
to ideas as strong idealism. Some philosophers, including Kant, 
have attempted to refute strong idealism by suggesting that an 
external world must exist in order for our ideas to exist, even if 
the exact nature of this world remains eternally beyond our 
grasp.3 More recently, certain analytic philosophers have gone in 
the opposite direction by suggesting that ideas, and all attendant 
notions of mind, consciousness, and the like, are somehow re­
ducible to physical or materialistic processes, thereby inverting 
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the nature of the problem entirely. For such philosophers, the 
question is how to account for the existence of the IFinternal 
world," and not vice versa. I make no attempt here to deal with 
either of these solutions. Rather, I want to suggest an alternate 
way to account for the existence of an external world beyond 
cognition or sense experience by examining the idea of logically 
necessary truth. 
II. Necessary Truth and the Existence of Physical Objects 
All relevant epistemological issues aside, it is generally accepted 
that certain truths of formal logic or mathematics, such as 
"2+2=4," are necessary, such that their denial implies a kind of 
unintelligible contradiction. To put it another way, we cannot 
intelligibly imagine a state of affairs in which a necessary state­
ment such as "2+2=4" could be false, provided that the terms in 
question are adequately defined. At the same time" howeverl we 
can intelligibly imagine a universe which is like ours in all 
respects except that it does not contain any human (or, for that 
matter" rational) beings. The question then becomes: do logically 
necessary truths obtain in such a universe? 
In one sense, this seems impossible, inasmuch as it is 
impossible to imagine any possible world in which the denial of 
"2+2=4/1 is true. But it is also clear that the very concepts 
(quanlitative and otherwise) that are presupposed by this state­
ment are unintelligible in the absence of rational minds to con­
ceive them. This latter point has led some philosophers to con­
clude that the whole notion of necessary truth is in some sense 
absurd. J. S. Mill, for instance, argues that the JI character of 
necessity ascribed to truths of mathematics, and even... the pecu­
liar certainty attributed to them" is an illusion [because] those 
h'uths relate to, and express the properties of, purely imaginary 
objects" (19). Similarly, A. J. Ayer points out that the reason 
necessary h'uths are necessary is that "we cannot abandon them 
without sinning against the rules which govern the use of lan­
guage, and so make our utterances self-stultifying" (33). But 
language is, of course, something which is inconceivable without 
the existence of beings who use language. In this sense, logically 
necessary truths are only necessary within a decidedly contin­
gent context - namely, a context in which rational beings exist. 
Assuming that the latter point is true, i.e., that the exis­
tence of rational beings is contingent, it follows that the existence 
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of any rational being X at time T is purely potential - that is, it 
mayor may not be the case that X exists at time T. Assuming 
further that the aforementioned truths of logic are ontologically 
dependent on the existence of some rational being X, it follows 
that these truths mayor may not obtain at time T, depending on 
whether X happens to exist at T. From these assumptions, it 
would seem to follow that in a universe such that X does not exist 
at time T, no logically necessary truths obtain at time T. 
Even if \ve grant that the instantiation of logically neces­
sary truths is ontolOgie ally dependent on the existence of some 
rational being X, it does not necessarily follow that there is a 
possible rational being X such that the existence of X could instan­
tiate a different or even contradictory set of logically necessary 
truths. In fact, it seems impossible to imagine a rational being X 
such that the existence of X instantiates a "truth" of the form 
"2+2=5./1 Even in a state of pure potentiality, logically necessary 
truths seem binding on all possible rational beings. To this extent, 
logically necessary truths remain necessary for all possible be­
ings, whether or not such beings ever happen to actually exist at 
all. 
This idea implies, among other things, that the truth­
value of certain logical axioms or propositions remains indepen­
dent of the actual cognition of some rational being X. In other 
words, certain axioms or propositions remain necessarily true 
even if the instantiation of these axioms or propositions by some 
rational being X is contingent. If this is the case, it follows that the 
truth value of logically necessary axioms or propositions is in 
some sense independent of the ontolOgical status of rational 
beings, possible or actual. They remain constant even in a uni­
verse in which rational beings happen not to exist. 
Taken at face value, this view carries a number of difficul­
ties. It seems absurd, for example, to suggest that 1/2+2==4" is a 
true proposition in a universe with no rational beings to instanti­
ate notions of quantity. Notice, however, that the very construc­
tion of these arguments necessarily implies that our universe is 
such that at least one rational being exists (namely, the author). 
And while it is certainly true that the rational being in question 
just happens to exist (that is, exists contingently), the fact remains 
that he does actually exist, which means that the aforementioned 
logically necessary truths obtain. 
Let us assume for a moment that the external world, and 
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all physical objects that are part of the external world, do not exist 
apart from the cognition of some rational being X (a position 
which is roughly synonymous with "strong idealism"). Most of 
the aforementioned logically necessary truths, especially those 
pertaining to mathematics, implicitly rely upon a principle of 
quantification, which in tum relies upon principles of identity 
through which physical objects are differentiated. If physical 
objects do not exist, then it makes no sense to speak of 
"identities" and, by extension, Itquantities." Thus the very idea of 
a statement such as 1/2+2=4/1 becomes, in some sense, unintelligi­
ble. 
As we have already seen, however, it is impossible for 
any possible rational being to come into existence and not to 
instantiate the aforementioned logically necessary truths. If this 
is the case, it follows that whenever some rational being X comes 
into existence at time T, it not only instantiates certain logically 
necessary truths, but also all the necessary preconditions in­
volved with the instantiation of these truths. Inasmuch as the 
actual existence of physical objects is a precondition of the instan­
tiation of at least some of these truths (viz., the laws of mathemat­
ics), it follows that the actual existence of some rational being X at 
time T necessitates the existence of physical objects. And inas­
much as at least one rational being actually exists (viz., the 
author), it follows that physical objects also exist. 
It may be objected that the actual existence of physical 
objects beyond the cognition of some rational being X is not 
necessary for the instantiation of relevant logically necessary 
truths. Quantity, for instance, may be derived from "ideas" of 
physical objects alone, whether or not these ideas correspond to 
some reality outside of the cOgnition of some rational being X. 
My reply is twofold. First, on what basis can quantity be derived 
if ideas alone exist? On a partially materialist view, quantity can 
be derived from physical differences - that is, we can decide that 
there are two things rather than one if the things in question meet 
certain physical criteria (e.g., the atoms of which they are con­
structed are at a certain spatio-temporal distance from each other, 
the atoms have differing chemical make-ups, etc.). On what 
grounds can we possibly say of two ideas that they are distinct 
without positing the existence of some kind of super-ideal sub­
stance? 
Second, the existence of ideas must come either from 
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some reality outside the cognition of some rational being X, or 
else from other ideas already present to that same being. If the 
latter is true, then the ideas in question must themselves come 
from other ideas, or else they must come from at least one innate 
idea. The former is not plausible because it leads to an endless 
causal chain of ideas. The latter, in contrast, needs to be ac­
counted for according to a principle of sufficient reason. Such an 
idea, even if innate, must come from somewhere apart from 
itself. Clearly it cannot come from another idea, since it is the first 
idea, which means either it comes from an external world apart 
from cognition or else was "implanted" by some other force. 
The question then becomes what this "other force" might 
be. If it is not part of an external world outside of cognition, then 
it must be some kind of "superphysical/l or supernatural force. 
We then must decide whether the alleged existence of such a 
IIsupernatural force" carries more evidentiary weight than the 
alleged existence of an external, phYSical world. The principle of 
parsimony (or Ockham's razor, if you prefer) allows us to elimi­
nate this hypothesis. There is no need to posit the existence of a 
supernatural force when we Call just as easily account for the 
existence of ideas with reference to an external world which 
exists apart from the cognition of some rational being X. 
The point is that quantity, among other things, logically 
entails the existence of physical objects, such that qUalltity cannot 
obtain apart from the existence of physical objects. Even in a 
world in which some rational being X happens not to exist, there 
is no state of affairs such that X could come into existence without 
the concomitant existence of physical objects, for these are neces­
sitated by the concomitant instantiation of logically necessary 
truths. The preceding proof can be expressed in the following 
syllogistic form: 
PI: If some rational being X exists at time T, then all 
logically necessary truths are instantiated; 
P2: The instantiation of some logically necessary h'uths is 
ontologically dependent on the existence of physical ob­
jects apart from the cognition of some rational being X. 
P3: No physical objects exist apart from the cognition of 
some rational being X. 
P4: Some rational being X exists at time T. 
el: Therefore, only logically necessary truths that are not 
ontologically dependent on the existence of physical ob­
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jects apart from the cognition of some rational being X are 
instantiated at time T. 
C2: But this is absurd (from PI and P2). 
C3: Therefore, P3 is false. 
C4: Therefore, some physical objects exist apart from the 
cognition of some rational being X at time T. 
In the foregoing proof, only a few of the premises are truly 
controversiaL P1 seems irreproachable because its negation 
would entail the denial of at least some logically necessary truths, 
which is impossible. P2, however, depends on the aforemen­
tioned idea that certain logically necessary truths, such as the 
laws of mathematics, require the existence of physical objects to 
be intelligible. I have already addressed one possible objection to 
this premise; are there any others? It seems that one could deny 
that concepts such as quantity are ontologically dependent upon 
the existence of physical objects, but it is unclear exactly how this 
would be the case. Quantity presupposes the existence of two Xs, 
where X is a physical object of some kind or else an idea derived 
from a physical object. 
The only other option is to deny the existence of cogni­
tion, in which case all physical objects exist apart from the 
cognition of some agent X. This option takes us beyond the 
purview of metaphysics and into the philosophy of mind; as such 
I make no attempt to deal with it here. The proof is not intended 
to demonstrate that all existence is reducible to physical phenom­
ena, but rather to refute the strong idealist position by demon­
strating that at least some things exist apart fmm the cognition of 
some rational being X. The question of whether cognition exists 
at all as a separate, non-physical phenomenon is left open. I 
should point out, however, that the general foundation of this 
proof, as well as its conclusions, seem perfectly compatible with 
a strong materialist view of mind and substance. 
III. Conclusion 
In sum, although the instantiation of logically necessary truths is 
ontologlcally dependent upon the existence of some rational 
being X, their necessity is such that they could not be otherwise 
for any possible rational being X. This implies that the actual 
existence of any rational being X at time T brings with it the 
instantiation of logically necessary truths, as well as any and all 
preconditions which this instantiation requires. I have argued 
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that the actual existence of physical objects is a precondition to 
the instantiation of at least some of these truths. Whether or not 
cognition stands in any real relationship to physical objects re­
mains an open question. But in the meantime, the existence of 
logically necessary laws provides sufficient grounds for conclud­
ing that at least some physical objects exist apart from the cogni­
tion of rational beings. 
Loyola University, Chicago 
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